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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5563
This paper examines de jure and de facto measures of 
regulations, finding the relationship between them is 
neither one for one, nor linear. “Doing Business” provides 
indicators of the formal time and costs associated with 
fully complying with regulations. Enterprise Surveys 
report the actual experiences of a wide range of firms. 
First, there are significant variations in reported times 
to complete the same transaction by firms facing the 
same formal policy. Second, regulatory compliance 
appears “under water” as firms report actual times much 
less than the Doing Business reported days. Third, the 
data reveal substantial differences between favored and 
disfavored firms in the same location. Favored firms show 
This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Financial and Private Sector Development. It is part of a 
larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at mhallward@worldbank.org.  
minimal variation, so Doing Business has little predictive 
power for the times they report. For disfavored firms, 
the variation is greater, although still not significantly 
correlated with Doing Business. Fourth, where multiple 
Enterprise Surveys are available, there is little association 
over time, with reductions in Doing Business days as likely 
to be accompanied by increases in Enterprise Surveys 
days. Comparing these two types of measures suggests 
very different ways of thinking about policy versus policy 
implementation, what “a climate” for firms in a country 
might mean, and what the options for “policy reform” 
really are.   
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For my friends, anything; 
for my enemies, the law. 
 
Oscar Benavides, 
Former President of Peru 
I.  Introduction 
Over the last decade there have been two major initiatives to measure the ―investment climate‖ 
that private sector firms face in developing countries, both with the goal of discovering and 
promoting those government policies and actions that could accelerate (broad based) economic 
growth.     
Far and away the most famous of these has been the Doing Business (DB) indicators 
supported by the World Bank.  DB assesses 10 elements of a country‘s policies that relate to 
private firms (e.g. starting a business, hiring workers, trading across borders, dealing with 
construction permits).  DB provides ‗league tables‘ on each of these 10 regulatory areas 
separately, as well as providing a widely cited overall ―Ease of Doing Business‖ ranking (e.g. in 
the 2010 ranking, Singapore as ranked number one and Central African Republic at 183).
1  The 
DB exercise assesses the country‘s ―investment climate‖ with experts that examine the relevant 
laws and procedures to assess the time and cost of compliance with the variety of governmental 
regulations, as well as the ease with which a variety of contracts between private parties can be 
entered into and enforced.
2    
A parallel effort, also carried out by the World Bank, has surveyed firms in developing 
countries.  This questionnaire includes modules that ask about the firm and its operations, what 
the firms perceive as obstacles to their own business and about their interactions with 
                                                 
1 A Google search on ―ease of doing business‖ and ―world bank‖ produces half a million hits.   
2 The Doing Business indicators were developed from collaborations with academics (e.g. Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003; Botero,  Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer 2004; Djankov, Simeon,  Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer 2007.). The 
DB data, once developed, has then been used to examine the effect of labor regulations (Micco and Pages 2006;), 
regulation of entry (Bruhn, forthcoming; Klapper, Laeven and Rajan. 2006), or a wide set of regulations (Loayza, 
Oviedo and Servén, 2006; Bolaky and Freund 2008; Eifert 2009) on cross-country outcomes of interest. 3 
 
government in policy compliance. These Enterprise Surveys (ES)
3 have now covered over 
100,000 firms in 117 countries, some with repeat surveys.
4  
The metaphor of a ―climate‖ for these measures is instructive.  Every day newspapers 
report the temperature in cities around the world.  Suppose in each city there was both an official 
thermometer and thousands of outdoor thermometers in houses around the city.  What do we 
expect from these measurements if we are capturing places with meaningful difference climates?
 
5  First, the variance of the outdoor temperatures around a given city (at a specified time of day, 
etc.) should be small compared to the inter-city variability: if it is hot in Phoenix and cool in 
Boston, it is hotter everywhere in Phoenix than anywhere in Boston. Second, regressing 
household temperature in city X on official temperature in city X would produce a coefficient 
near one. Third, one would expect the variance across household reported temperatures to be 
invariant to the official temperature.  Fourth, changes in the official temperature would be highly 
associated with changes in outdoor household temperatures.   
Imagine the same thought experiment with experienced temperature for a given 
individual in a rich country.  None of the above is true.  First, the main variance in experienced 
temperature is person specific.  If it is July and you are indoors in Phoenix you are probably 
experiencing the same temperature as a person indoors in Boston, but a wildly different 
experienced temperature than anyone outdoors in Phoenix.  Second, experienced indoor 
temperature may have no association with outdoor temperature.  Third, variance in experienced 
temperature gets larger the further the outdoor temperature is from the ideal—towards either hot 
                                                 
3 The Enterprise Surveys build on a number of prior efforts with different names, that since 2005 have been 
standardized and use the same questionnaire and methodology, while maintaining their brand name in their 
respective regions, e.g. Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) in Africa; Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance (BEEPS) in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Investment Climate Surveys were conducted 
prior to 2005, using largely the same questionnaire but with sample generally restricted to manufacturing firms.  
4 The Enterprise Surveys (including their precursors World Business Environment Survey, BEEPS, RPED) have 
been used to show the importance of finance, corruption and property rights (Beck et al. 2005; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-
Kunt and  Maksimovic 2008; Gatti and Fisman 2006; Cai et al 2006; Fisman and Svensson, 2007), the relationship 
between business environment and firm growth, (Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae, 2005; Haltiwanger and 
Schweiger 2005; Dollar et al, 2006; Hallward-Driemeier Wallsten and Xu 2006; Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and 
Pages, forthcoming; Eifert et al 2008; Fernandes and Pakes 2008;); firm innovation(Almeida and Fernandes 2008; 
Ayyagari , Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2010); informality (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008); labor protections 
(Pierre and Scarpetta 2006; Almeida and Carneiro 2009).  Two survey articles provide reviews of the literature 
drawing primarily on Enterprise Survey like data: Bigsten and Soderbom, 2006 and Xu 2010.   
5 Which imply that a ―country‖ may or may not be a meaningful definition of ―place‖ for describing climates.  
Certainly, one cannot imagine asserting that the USA, which ranges from Maine to Florida and Alaska to Hawaii, 
has a meaningful ―climate‖ in the way that a small country like Jamaica might.  4 
 
or cold as the temperature difference between people experiencing outdoor temperature and 
indoor, climate controlled, temperature is wider.  Fourth, experienced indoor temperature stays 
pretty constant throughout the year, even as outdoor temperature varies widely. When people 
have climate control experienced temperature is a characteristic of people, not places.   
An ES in the same country in the same year as a DB rating allows examination of the 
areas in which the two overlap to ask:  How much of what it is like for a given firm to do 
business in country X does ―Doing Business‖ in country X capture?   We use three areas that 
have similar, though unfortunately not identical, questions: importing goods, starting a 
business/getting an operating license, getting a construction permit, to examine the relationship 
between firm specific ES reports and the country reported DB.  The strong conclusion emerging 
from the four empirical findings in out paper is that experienced policy implementation is about 
firms, not countries.   
First, there is massive variance across firms in their reported experiences, but little of this 
is associated with variation in the comparable DB Indicator.  The typical variation across firms in 
the same country in experienced policy is of roughly similar magnitude to the entire cross-
national variation in average policy experience.     
Second, the relationship between the central tendency (average, median) of the ES firm 
responses and DB is not one for one, not linear, and not statistically strong.  For all three 
indicators the linear slope of the regression of country average of ES and DB is well less than, 
and statistically different from, one (for two of the three the slope is not statistically different 
from zero).  When we relax the assumption of linearity (either by allowing one or two splines or 
a quartic in DB) we find that over the lower ranges of DB there is a weak relationship, but as the 
DB days rise to even modest levels the association disappears.  
For firms in the ES samples there is typically ―water in the regulations‖ (when countries 
had very high tariffs there was ―water in the tariffs‖ when the tariff was so high demand would 
remain zero even if the tariff was reduced).  The DB assessment of the regulations imply that 
there is massive ―water in the regulations‖—that is, the firms report that it takes then 
considerably less time to accomplish the tasks than the DB indicators suggest as the ―official‖ 
climate.  For instance, the DB indicators report it takes 411 days to get a construction permit in 5 
 
Brazil.  The 262 sampled firms who reported getting a construction permit reported on average a 
time to get a construction permit of 85 days.  For the 80 countries with both DB and ES results 
the average excess of the DB days to get a construction permit versus the ES average is 177 days, 
almost three times larger than the firm reported average time of 64 days.  
Third, we examine the associated between DB and the firms who report very quick times 
(the ―favored‖ firms) and those who report very slow times (the ―disfavored‖ firms).   Using the 
10
th or 25
th percentile of firm reported times we find that for these firms the DB numbers mean 
nothing at all.  In every country the ―favored‖ firms report very little delay in any of the three 
indicators (clearing customs, getting construction permits, or operating licenses)—and hence are 
massively under-water.  The median DB time to get a construction permit is 242 days, about 
eight months.  The median 10
th and 25
th percentiles are one week and two weeks respectively.  
For time to import goods the results are, if anything, more dramatic, the median DB time is 23 
days, the 10
th percentile is 1 day, 25
th percentile is 2 days.  Moreover, there is almost no variation 
across countries in the ES ―favored firm‖ responses.  The standard deviation across countries in 
―favored firm‖ (25
th percentile) time to get a permit was 12 days (compared to a standard 
deviation of 119 days in the DB indicator).   
In contrast, there is a set of firms that do find regulations an obstacle, and the extent of 
delay for those firms does vary widely across countries.  The ―disfavored‖ firms—those in the 
90
th percentile—show huge differences across countries, the standard deviation for getting a 
construction permit of the 90
th percentile is 106 days.  Even though there are large differences, 
these are not well explained by a simple linear association with DB.  Rather, there is a sharply 
non-linear pattern in which increases in DB days from low levels are associated with a rapid 
increase in the time reported by ―disfavored firms‖ (90
th percentile), but for increases above the 
first tercile of the data (and at least by the median) there is no association between the DB 
indicator and the ES 90
th percentile responses.  
Fourth, several countries have repeated ES surveys that span a change in the 
corresponding DB indicator.  While these are many substantial reductions in the DB reported 
time, there were almost no instances in which this was associated with a fall in the ES reported 
time for compliance.  In fact, the change in average responses reported by firms often rose.  This 6 
 
could reflect greater enforcement or compliance.  But interestingly, the spread across firms also 
often rises.   
This paper is just simple empirics and gives simple, but compelling, answers.  If we ask 
―are people hotter in Phoenix?‖ we could plausibly answer ―No, for the most part, people stay 
indoors with air conditioning‖ without positing complex behavioral theories and testing their 
causal assertions.  We are just examining the data and use regressions as data summarizing 
techniques, not to assert causality or test theories.  But we do find that the idea that a single 
country number summarizes completely, or even modestly well, the policy experiences of firms 
in those countries, even when limited to the same domain, is not tenable.  We caution the reader 
from jumping from this to any particular conclusion about the implications of what this means, 
as we don‘t know.  We are unsure just what these empirical findings mean but they must imply 
something about how we should think about policy, policy implementation, and policy reform 
for promoting and accelerating broad based growth, and we are as anxious as they next guy and 
gal to find us just what it does mean.     
II.  Description of the data 
The two large-scale, multiple year, multiple country data collection efforts undertaken by the 
World Bank, each of which uses a different approach to understanding the constraints facing the 
private sector.  DB provides measures of compliance with regulatory requirements and ES 
provides firms‘ reported experiences associated with regulations and other investment climate 
conditions.  By using them together, this paper explores the relationship between de jure and de 
facto measures of regulations.  
DB provides indicators in 10 regulatory areas of the number of procedures, the time and 
costs associated with complying with formal requirements.  It uses a hypothetical ―standard‖ 
firm (e.g. a privately and domestically owned, limited liability company with 10-50 employees 
operating in the country‘s largest city) and standardized transactions that could apply to many 
different activities (e.g. building a warehouse; enforcing a contract worth twice the country‘s 
income per capita).  It explicitly assumes full compliance, that no third parties are used to 
facilitate completing procedures and that no payments or other activities are undertaken to 
influence policy outcomes.  The measures are compiled by one to four lawyers or accountants in 7 
 
each country based on the typical times it would take to comply based on their assessment of the 
actual wording of the regulations as they exist on the books. 
Despite its emphasis on measuring regulations on the books, there are a few instances 
where DB ends up including some steps that are not purely regulatory in nature.  For example, 
the DB indicator for ‗trading across borders‘ actually has 4 sub-components, one of which is 
―inland transportation.‖   Beyond the mixing of some regulatory and non-regulatory components, 
this also raises questions about how the indicator was measured.   It is estimated by a single (or 
sometimes a couple of) lawyers in the capital city – based on their understanding of their clients‘ 
experiences.  As lawyers in large firms, their clients are unlikely to be representative of more 
typical firms‘ experiences, nor are these lawyers the business people with experience in this area.  
For this work, we thus remove the ‗inland transportation‘ portion of the DB indicator. For the 
other two indicators, there could also be some steps in some countries that do not seem to be 
completely regulatory in nature.  However, the number of steps and their categorization is not 
standardized across countries, and concerned of adding more measurement error by selectively 
deleting some in some countries, no changes have been made. 
The ES does not try to measure what should happen, but rather what did happen in 
practice.  It gathers responses from large, random samples of firms in the main urban centers in a 
country.   The face to face interviews ask for quantitative information from the firm owners and 
senior managers about how long it takes to get various regulatory procedures done and how 
much they cost – including actions to influence policy implementation, like bribes or gifts or 
meeting with government officials.
6  The full spectrum of firms by size are included, as well as 
foreign and state owned enterprises, so one can compare the experiences across types of firms. 
In making comparisons across the two sources of data, there are three regulatory areas 
covered by both DB and the ES instruments with sufficient numbers of firm responses
7:  time to 
get operating licenses, time to get construction permits and time to clear goods through customs.  
While the same regulatory areas are covered, it should be remembered that the questions are not 
asked exactly the same way.  First, DB provides very precise instructions on what to include or 
                                                 
6 The survey also asks about other topics (e.g. broader set of investment climate conditions), subjective as well as 
quantitative measures and about the firm‘s performance. 
7 E.g. Use of courts was limited to only a few respondents in most countries.  Regulatory procedures around closing 
a firm were not included as the sample was of continuing firms.   8 
 
not in the measure, while the ES simply asks ‗how long did it take to get a construction permit?‘  
Some of the variation within the ES is no doubt due to the fact that respondents may have 
different notions of which steps they did and did not include in their assessment.  Second, ES 
respondents are also unlikely to have precise records as to the length of time procedures took, 
and so will report estimates.  Both of these points are potential sources of measurement error, but 
are unlikely to drive the patterns we see, particularly across countries.
  
Third, DB has a precisely defined ―standard‖ firm conducting the transaction, e.g. a 
10-50 employee, domestically owned private company.  The ES are a sample of firms – both 
larger and smaller than 10-50 employees – and different ownership types.  It is possible that 
some of the variation within country in the ES is that the regulatory requirements themselves 
vary by firm size or ownership.  However, only using those firms that match the characteristics 
of the ‗standard‘ hypothetical DB firm, leads to the same basic empirical results as the ones we 
report—but does reduce sample sizes so we stick to the full samples.  
The fourth difference between the DB and ES is the most interesting one:  the assumption 
that firms fully comply – and with no direct or third-party facilitation (monetary or otherwise) 
involved.  But firms do not necessarily comply in the ways anticipated in the DB instrument.  
The respondents in the ES themselves report that additional payments are frequently made to 
‗help get things done.‘  Moreover, as we show, if what firms report as their experiences mirrored 
the formal requirements, the data in the graphs comparing the two across countries would line up 
along a 45 degree line.  The size of the gap between the two sources of data (i.e. how far below 
the 45 degree line most of the observations in the graphs are) illustrates how costly it would be 
not to try to strike a deal – and that assuming no deals are made does not, in fact, reflect what 
firms do.   
III.  Comparing Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys 
What is the connection between the DB indicators and the average value reported by the firms in 
the ES?  For each of the three indicators (imports, operating license, and construction permit) we 
provide scatter plots (Figures 1a, 1b, 1c) and regression results using a variety of functional 
forms (Table 1).  All three indicators have roughly similar patterns that:  9 
 
(i)  for most of the range of the data the average firm is far ―under water‖ in that the time 
reported by firms is far less than the reported time in DB 
(ii)  the cross-national correlation between the two indicators, even at the country level, is very 
weak, with R-Squared coefficients well below .05 for operating licenses and construction 
permits. 
(iii)   there is an apparent non-linear pattern in which as the DB days increases from low levels 
the corresponding ES average value increases (though well less thhan one for one) but at 
higher values the slope becomes quite flat and increases in DB do little to increase the 
reported ES average. 
Since we are using regressions merely as a data summary technique we did not want to 
impose any particular strong functional form or constraints on the non-linearity of the 
relationships that might emerge.  Therefore, we estimated four different functional forms.  We 
allowed splines (kinks but with continuity) of three different types: (a) a single spline at the 
median, (b) two even placed splines and (c) an ―optimal‖ or goodness of fit maximizing choice 
of two splines
8.  In addition we just use a quartic specification.  
Imports.  Figure 1a shows the relations between the DB indicator for time taken for 
imports (less inland transport time) compared to the days that firms reported it took them for 
imports.  The figures show the predicted values for each of the four functional forms, which in 
this case are quite similar.  As seen in table 1, the simple linear OLS regression produces a 
coefficient of .14, which is significantly different from either 0 or 1 and produces an R2 of 
.129—so only a small fraction of the cross-national variation in firm reported average time is 
associated with the variation in DB.   
Moreover, all of the functional forms show sharply lower coefficients connecting the two 
variables as the value of the DB indicator is higher.  For instance, the slope of the quartic at the 
10
th percentile (10 days) of the DB is .482 versus only .07 at the 50
th percentile (23 days).  All of 
the splines show similar results, with sharply lower slopes when the DB values are above even 
                                                 
8 The goodness of fit maximizing spline was chosen by a simple grid search procedure of dividing the data into 
deciles and then evaluating the R2 at each possible combination of deciles and choosing the pair of data values to 
allow the regression to kink as the R2 maximizing point.   10 
 
modest values—the ―optimal‖ two kink spline suggests the slope is only .11 above 13 days
9.  
The predicted mean ES reported days is only 4 days higher for a country with a DB of 58 days 
versus a DB of 20 days.  This leaves the countries with high DB values ―under water‖ as the 
average time is well below the DB time—for Kazakhstan the DB time is 38 days higher than the 
ES average.    
 
                                                 
9 Given the overall weak relationships the F-tests show none of the splines for imports are statistically significant.  11 
 
Table 1:  Enterprise Survey average value reported by firms by country regressed on 
the DB value 
  Imports  Construction Permit  Operating License 
OLS regression 
Constant  5.99    52.49    36.22   
Slope  0.14  0.05  0.00 
N  91  74.00  87.00 
R-Squared  0.129  0.03  0.00 
t-test, β=0  0.000  0.07  0.49 













0.224  43  -0.09  381  0.16  95 
R-Squared  0.160    0.08    0.01   
Spine at median 
Slope below (value 
at kink) 
0.25  23.00  0.21  210.00  0.32  31.00 
Slope high  0.11    0.01    -0.06   
p-value  0.38    0.17    0.60   
Two splines, at thirds of DB 
Slope below  
(value at 1
st kink) 




nd kink (value 
at 2
nd kink) 
0.13  32.00  -0.09  255.00  -0.27   
Slope above second 
kink 
0.11    0.04    -0.04   
p-value  0.63    0.18    0.71   
Two splines (goodness of fit maximizing) 
Slope low  -0.07  10.00  0.27  234.60  0.63  42.20 
Slope medium  1.08  13.30  -0.27  332.20  -2.97  51.00 
Slope high  0.11    0.13    0.12   
p-value  0.38    0.06    0.35   





Construction Permit.  The results for obtaining a ―construction permit‖ are even more 
dramatic because the variation in the DB reported values are themselves so widely spread, with a 
10
th percentile of 137 days and a 90
th percentile of 381 days.  For a construction permit the OLS 
slope is only weakly different from zero (p value .07) while a value of 1 (ES reflects DB one for 
one) can be easily rejected.  All of the non-linear function forms show that the slope much lower 
at higher than lower values of the DB value.  So for instance, the simple spline at the median of 
210 days shows a slope below of .21 and a slope above of .01—so that the increase in 170 days 
from the median of 210 to the 90
th percentile of 381 is only associated with a less than 2 day 
increase in the average ES value.  Again, the fact that all of the ES values tend to be below the 
DB values plus the small slope puts the countries with high reported DB values far under 
water—the gap between the DB value of 411 days and the ES mean of 85 for Brail is 326 days.   
 13 
 
Operating License.  The results for comparing the DB values for starting business to 
those of the ES firms reporting for obtaining an operating license are different in three respects.  
First, there is zero correlation between the two overall so the simple OLS regression coefficient 
rounds to zero, is not statistically different from zero (though again, one for one can be rejected) 
and the R2 is also (naturally) near zero.  Second, while for the other indicators countries are 
under water roughly over the entire range of the data, countries are not consistently underwater 
until they pass roughly 50 days—though after that point every country but Peru has an ES value 
lower than its DB value.  Third,  as can be seen from the scatter diagram the non-linear forms 
give a very strongly upward sloping relationship at low values but then appear to have a negative 
slope (to accommodate the cluster of countries at 40-60 DB days but low ES average days) and 
then in the higher range flattens out (or is negative).  However, none of the splines are 




IV.  DB and “favored” and “disfavored” firms in the ES  
The ES data reveal that, for any given country or question, there are enormous reported 
differences across firms.  When firms are asked about time to obtain an operating license, 
construction permit, or clear goods through customs the responses not only do not cluster tightly 
around the DB average but do not cluster around the ES average.  A significant fraction of firms 
report that (their version of) regulatory compliance takes essentially not time at all, while others 
report significant delays. So there is an important question of how the levels of the DB indicators 
are associated with the dispersion and entire distribution of firm level responses.  One notion 
might be that an increase in the DB time from say 20 days to 50 days would just shift the entire 
distribution up, so that all firms would have roughly X additional days.  However that is not at all 
what the data suggest.  Rather the data suggest that the ―favored‖ firms are affected roughly not 
at all by increases in the DB figure while, at low levels the dispersion increases as the firms who 
report relatively long delays report longer delays as the DB value goes up, but only to a point, 
after which there is roughly no effect on the distribution of responses at all.    
The figures 2a, 3a and 4a show the scatter plots for each country of the 10
th and the 90
th 
percentile of the firm responses plotted against the DB for imports, business licenses, and 
construction permits respectively to show how the dispersion of ES responses evolves with DB.    
One common pattern is clearest for construction permits (Figure 3a).   When the DB 
value moves from its lowest value of 77 days (for Lesotho) to the (third) highest value of 471 
days in Ukraine the predicted 10
th percentile (using the two spline specification) increases from 
4.5 days to 8.2—hence a 400 day increase in the DB value is associated with a less than 4 days 
increase in the predicted value of the 10
th percentile (and only 5 and a half days in the 25
th 
percentile).  In sharp contrast, the increase from 77 days to the tercile of 172 (Laos) increases the 
predicted ES response in the two spline specification from 29 days to 189 days while the change 
from 172 days to 471 days (Ukraine) leads to a small decrease in predicted ES responses at the 
90










Table 2 shows the regression equivalent of the figures, with regressions using each 
country‘s percentiles of the distribution of firm responses as the dependent variable and using, in 
this case, a two spline specification regression (with the kinks at the terciles) with the single DB 
value of the corresponding indicator as the independent variable.  There are two striking results.   
First, the cross-national standard deviation of the ES variable increases by more than an 
order of magnitude in each case, e.g. for construction permits the cross national standard 
deviation of the 25
th percentile firm is 11.8 days while the 90
th percentile is 106.  This just means 
that in the case of the lower end of the distribution, the ―favored‖ firms there is just not much 
variation to explain (independently of the question of whether DB variation explains it).  In 
contrast, the variation across countries appears predominantly in what happens at the upper tail—
the 90
th percentile firms report at least twice as much variation as the 75
th percentile.   
Second, the association between ES and DB generally gets stronger but also more non-
linear across the percentiles.  So the slope in the lowest tercile of DB is essentially zero for the 
10
th percentile of the ES distribution for each of the indicators.  In contrast, the slope of the ES 
90
th percentile in the lowest tercile range of DB is .8, 1.6 and .7 for imports, construction 
permits, and business licenses respectively.   But for the 90
th percentile there is also sharp non-
linearity, as the slope is .23, .006 and .13 for the same three variables.   18 
 
Table 2:  Regressions of the percentiles of the firm level distribution across countries 
from the ES on the DB value 
  
  Percentiles of ES distribution for firm level 
response as dependent variable 
Value of DB 
days at kink 
(terciles)    10
th   25
th   75
th   90th  
Imports 
Std. Dev of ES 
percentile  1.226  2.399  8.167  16.158   
Constant  0.970  1.350  2.469  7.261   
Slope in first 
tercile of DB   0.031  0.054  0.487  0.806  18.00 
Slope in second 
tercile of DB  0.019  0.088  0.160  0.294  32.00 
Slope in upper 
tercile of DB  0.037  0.052  0.119  0.231   
N  91.000  91.000  91.000  91.000   
R2  0.148  0.173  0.133  0.108   
Construction Permit 
Std. Dev of ES 
percentile  5.873  11.820  43.296  106.811   
Constant  2.603  -2.046  11.402  -100.589   
Slope in first 
tercile of DB   0.024  0.118  0.354  1.685  172.00 
Slope in second 
tercile of DB  0.024  0.013  0.123  -0.276  255.00 
Slope in upper 
tercile of DB  -0.002  -0.031  -0.051  0.006   
N  73.000  73.000  73.000  73.000   
R2  0.040  0.057  0.053  0.083   
  5.873  11.820  43.296  106.811   
Starting a business/operating license 
Std. Dev of ES 
percentile  2.541  6.706  18.038  44.126   
Constant  4.062  8.642  31.392  52.244   
Slope in first 
tercile of DB   -0.042  -0.001  -0.005  0.701  22.00 
Slope in second 
tercile of DB  -0.063  -0.228  -0.243  -0.273  44.00 
Slope in upper 
tercile of DB  0.022  0.055  0.091  0.128   
N  87.000  87.000  87.000  87.000   







The result of this, as seen in Table 3, is that there is essentially no difference in the 
responses of firms at the low end of the distribution no matter what the country DB value is, but 
substantial differences in the higher end.  So for instance, the range of the DB data on imports is 
80 days (84 versus 4) while the difference in the 10
th percentile is only 2.6 days and the 25
th 
percentile is 4.7 days.  This implies the ―favored‖ firms in the ―worst‖ rated countries by the DB 
indicator do much better than the ―disfavored‖ firms in the ―best‖ rated DB countries.  So the 
10
th percentile firm in Uzbekistan, the country with the highest DB ranking of 84 days, is 
predicted to get imports through customs in 3.7 days versus 4.4 days for the 75
th percentile firm 
in Estonia, with a DB ranking of only 4 days.   
But on the other side, nearly all of the action happens at the upper end, the ―disfavored‖ 
firms.  As detailed above, the DB range of 524 days from the ―best‖ to ―worst‖ in construction 
permits produces a predicted 25
th percentile difference of less than 2 days.  However, the 90
th 
percentile firm has a difference of 140 days between ―best‖ and worst‖—and again, essentially 
all of this increase happens between the lowest DB value (77days) and the 25
th percentile (155 
days).   21 
 
Table 3:  Predicted values of various percentiles of the distribution 







Country  Actual 
DB 
value 
Percentiles of the distribution across 
firms in the ES (predicted using two 
spline regression) 




Min  EST  4  1.1  1.6  4.4  10.5 
25th   MEX  15  1.4  2.2  9.8  19.4 
50th  NPL  23  1.6  2.8  12.0  23.2 
75th  BDI  34  1.9  3.7  13.7  26.3 








Min  LBR  77  4.5  7.0  38.7  29.1 
25th   CHL  155  6.4  16.2  66.3  160.6 
50th  PER  210  7.7  18.7  77.0  178.7 
75th  GTM  286  8.7  18.3  81.0  166.5 








Min  GEO  3  3.9  8.6  31.4  54.3 
25th   SVK  16  3.4  8.6  31.3  63.5 
50th  NPL  31  2.6  6.6  29.1  65.2 
75th  BOL  50  1.9  3.9  26.5  62.4 




180  0.9  2.6  7.2  25.1 
V.  Variability in the ES results  
The next question is whether the variance across firms in the ES surveys increases or decreases 
with the increase in the DB indicator.  Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c show the 90
th-10
th percentile spread 
for each country for imports, construction permits, and operating license.  In this case, the 
indicators show different patterns.  For construction permits the cross-country variance increases 
with DB at first, then flattens out entirely (consistent with the results in Table 2 showing that the 22 
 
10
th percentile in ES was invariant to DB while the 90
th first increased then flattened out). With 
imports (Figure 5b) the spread increases and then flattens out—but continues to increase.  
Finally, there is no apparent relationship between the ES spread in operating license and the DB 







Table 4 is the regression equivalent of the figures which shows that the tendencies in the 
graphs are typically not statistically significant.  For construction permits for instance the lowest 
slope is 1.22 and falls to .010 and -.018 in the upper ranges of the DB data.  However, the F-test 
on the spline terms fails to reject that 1.22 and .010 are different because the standard errors on 
each coefficient are so large—the data cannot reject that 1.22 is equal to zero (t-stat is only 1.84) 
so cannot reject it is equal to .01.   
 





associated with increases in the DB days at best at low levels of DB 
 





  90-10  75-25  90-10  75-25  90-10  75-25 
Constant  
(t-stat) 
7.887  1.221  -50.446  27.821  48.182  22.750 
1.056  0.350  -0.515  0.766  2.712  3.630 
Slope over lowest tercile of DB 
(t-stat) 
0.616  0.422  1.228  0.119  0.743  -0.005 
1.179  1.732  1.849  0.482  0.640  -0.012 
Slope over middle tercile of DB 
data (t-stat) 
0.287  0.074  0.010  0.195  -0.210  -0.015 
0.371  0.204  0.010  0.524  -0.118  -0.024 
Slope over upper tercile of DB 
data (t-stat) 
0.126  0.012  -0.018  -0.027  0.105  0.036 
0.289  0.059  -0.029  -0.119  0.121  0.116 
N  88  88  72  72  87  87 
R2  0.088  0.081  0.076  0.055  0.011  0.004 
F-test of spline terms  0.545  0.203  0.166  0.435  0.855  0.963 
Outliers deleted  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
VI.  Comparing changes in Doing Business with changes in ES 
The results shown so far are based on cross-national comparisons in which we have matched the 
DB indicator to the year of the ES survey.  DB has been updated annually since its introduction 
in 2003.  However, the ES have been repeated in only a few countries, generally with a 3-5 year 
lag.  This section uses only those countries for which an ES was fielded, there was then a formal 
change in the regulation that manifests as a reduction in the formal time expected for the 
requirement to be met, and another ES fielded.   
The frequency of reforms varies across the 3 indicators.  Reforms were more frequent for 
getting goods through customs and getting operating licenses.  However, there are only 3 
instances of reforms of construction permits enacted between Enterprise Surveys. 25 
 
The patterns are presented showing the change in the DB time on the horizontal axis, 
with the arrows starting at the initial DB time and the arrow head at the new DB time.  Almost 
all arrows point to the left, indicating a reduction in the formal time associated with compliance.  
If there is a corresponding decline in the ES measures (country average or country 90
th-10
th 
percentile spread) the arrows should also point downwards.  If arrows are pointing to the left and 
up, declines in DB times are associated with increases in experienced times.
10 
Figure 6a:  Changes in DB times to clear customs – and changes in averages reported in ES 
surveys conducted before and after the reform 
 
Figure 6a clearly show that, while in every instance the change in the Doing Business 
indicator was to lower the time to clear goods through customs (all arrows point left) this 
essentially never matched by a significant decline in the time experienced by firms.  For the 
countries where the Doing Business indicator was high, e.g. above 45 such as Madagascar 
(MDG) or Laos (LAO) or countries among the higher ES averages such are Turkey (TUR) the 
                                                 
10 It is possible that in some countries there was only a short lag between the DB reform and the launch of the 
second ES such that some respondents‘ answers could still refer to pre-reform conditions.  If this is true, this would 
likely cause the arrows to be horizontal pointing left. 26 
 
ES averages significantly higher post-reform even though the DB is much lower.   Thus, there 
are many instances where lowering the official requirement led firms to report longer delays in 
clearing customs.  In most other instances reductions in DB days by 20 or more days led to 
essentially no change in reported ES average days.  




These patterns hold not only for the average times reported by firms, but also the 90th-10
th 
percentile spreads.  The spreads increased in the majority of cases.  Again, those where the 
spreads declined were those countries that reduced the Doing Business indicator to the lowest 
levels.  Lower delays or time requirements is not sufficient to lower spreads; on the lower end of 
requirements, countries experienced a range of changes, but none of the countries with higher 
requirements saw declines in practice.  27 
 
Figure 6c:  Changes in DB time to get an operating license, with change in ES country 
average pre and post reform 
 
For operating licenses there are only eight countries so there is nothing ―statistical‖ that 
can be said (Figure 6c).  There is one country, Bulgaria, that actually increased it requirements, 
so its arrow points to the right.  But the change in reported averages ranges considerably, with 
many countries having higher reported averages despite reductions in official times to complete 
requirements. Where the average reported times rose, so did the spread of times across firms.  
Some countries did have downward sloping estimates, such as KGZ (keep in mind in these 
graphs the DB scale is two and half times as large as the ES scale).   28 
 




For construction permits, there are only 3 examples and hence we do not report the 
graphs.   
One issue in drawing these graphs was determining the appropriate lag between a change 
in the formal requirements and when they would be expected to show up in firms‘ reported 
experience.  DB generally benchmarks conditions as of June of the previous year (e.g. Doing 
Business 2008 is published in the fall of 2007 and the indicators are based on conditions as of 
June 2007).  In the above graphs, this data from June 2007 has been paired with Enterprise 
Surveys conducted in 2008, i.e. any changes between June 2006 and June 2007 would then be 
linked to the responses in firms the following year.  This ensures that the firms are all 
experiencing the initial reforms.  However, this lag may also miss more recent reforms that firms 
will actually have experienced, and so is underestimating the effects of reforms.  As a robustness 
check, we repeat the graphs, this time matching changes between June 2006 and June 2007 with 
firms surveyed in 2007.  As reforms have tended to become more common in recent years, this 
allows additional Doing Business reforms to be included in the graphs.  As shown below, the 
additional examples simply reinforce the patterns already discussed above.29 
 
Figure 6e:  Changes in DB times to clear customs – and changes in averages reported in ES 
surveys conducted before and after the reform (shorter DB lag) 
 
Figure 6f:  Changes in DB times to get operating permits – and changes in averages 




These graphs have drawn on the full range of firms in the ES sample.  As discussed 
above, DB strictly applies to the firms in its hypothetical scenario it presents to its lawyers and 
accountants, i.e. private, domestically owned firms with 10-50 employees.  With the additional 
requirement that there be at least 20 respondents for a country to be included, these restrictions 
on the types of firms results in fewer countries.  However, the patterns are not significantly 
different.   
Figure 6g:  Changes in DB time to get an operating license, with change in ES country 




VII.  Conclusion 
So far, this is a paper Sergeant Joe Friday of the LAPD could love: it‘s just the facts.  That said, 
Joe Friday, like the rest of us, was ultimately interested in piecing the facts into a coherent 
narrative that explains events.  Our facts fit into four broad literatures related to policy and its 
impact on firm and economic performance.   31 
 
First, although ours is the first attempt to examine the differences between the Doing 
Business estimates of compliance times with the actual distribution of experienced times from 
firm surveys, our findings are building on earlier literatures about the heterogeneity of regulatory 
compliance in specific countries and sectors.  A classic early contribution was Stone, Levy and 
Paredes (1996) which showed that a comparison of the formal regulations of registering a 
business in Chile versus Brazil would lead one to conclude that Chile as a much better place to 
do business as its formal regulations were stream-lined while the regulatory path to registering a 
firm in Brazil was ―tortuous.‖  But, when they examined actual practice they found that in 
response to this difficulty of the formal regulations an industry of negotiating this on behalf of 
firms had emerged that made business registration ―a fairly affordable one-stop process.‖  
Pritchett and Sethi (1994) had many of the same findings for the collection of import tariffs.  
They showed that: (a) the collected ad valorem tariff rates were much lower than the legal ad 
valorem tariff; (b) that collected tariff rates increased much less than one for one with legal 
tariffs; and (c) huge heterogeneity in collected tariff rates across items with the exact same legal 
tariff.  Similarly, Gauthier and Gersovitz (1997) use a survey of firms in Cameroon to show how 
tax exemptions and evasion at the firm specific level cause massive deviations between the 
hypothetical de jure tax revenues if the tax code were applied and the actual revenues collected.  
A recent application of randomization investigated the granting of driver‘s licenses in Delhi 
India (Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, Mullainathan 2007) and found that individuals who hired a 
tout were effectively exempted from one element of regulatory compliance (the driving exam) 
while those who did not hire a tout did have to take the exam (and often failed).  Our findings 
confirm at a cross-national scale and for a number of indicators the commonly observed, but hard 
to document, fact that policy implementation often deviates from the stated policy, in firm (or 
individual) specific ways. 
Second, our findings are also related to the large literature on corruption and its 
relationship to firm profitability, regulatory compliance, and regulations themselves and hence 
on economic performance (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1993).  Fisman (2001) uses the connection 
between variations in the stock market value of firms in Indonesia, their connections to Suharto, 
and information about Suharto‘s health to show that often a significant value of the firm‘s value 
was due to their political connections, presumably because these connections allowed them 
greater profitability.  Research on the transition in post-communist countries, in which 32 
 
―institutions‖ were in flux showed that firms used their profits to both block future reform 
(Hellmann 1998), create ―crony bias‖ through an ―inequality of influence‖ that deterred other 
firms from relying on or engaging with state institutions (Hellmann and Kaufmann 2002), and 
even ―capture‖ the state to change the laws and regulations themselves to disadvantage rivals 
(Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000).  While this paper provides no direct evidence of 
corruption, the massive, firm specific deviations in reported compliance times and the deviation 
from the Doing Business estimated times to compliance are at least consistent with environments 
of policy implementation that are permeable.  Indeed, earlier work that focused on Africa, found 
that where the gaps between DB and ES were larger, the frequency of bribes paid increased 
(Hallward-Driemeier, Khun-Jush and Pritchett 2010). 
Third, a massive current puzzle for economists is explaining the differential response of 
economic growth to the policy reforms of the 1980s and 1990s—which some countries booming 
after modest reforms while others stagnating even after massive reforms (World Bank 2005) and 
more broadly the pattern of growth accelerations and decelerations (Hausmann, Pritchett, Rodrik 
2005, Jones and Olken, 2007).   At least one hypothesis for explaining the differential responses 
to ―policy reform‖ may be that when de jure and de facto policy have diverged the impact of de 
jure reform might have wildly different effects, depending on how it affects firm‘s distribution of 
expectations (both mean and variance) about their future experienced policy (Pritchett 2005).  To 
revert to the temperature analogy, the average daily high temperature in July is Phoenix is 105 
but most people are not hot, they are indoors.  How much would the experienced temperature 
change if the daily high were reduced to 100? To 95?  Actually it might be somewhat higher as 
more people would be outdoors while those indoors would be the same temperature.  On the 
other hand, if air conditioning were banned, experienced temperature would sky-rocket with no 
change in the climate.  Given our evidence, it is a completely open question how DB indicators 
(as proxies for costs of compliance) would have to be before the experienced investment climate 
of most firms was affected—or became attractive to compliance constrained investors.  In our 
previous paper ―Deals versus Rules‖ (Hallward-Driemeier, Khun-Jush, and Pritchett 2010) we 
showed the firm performance was affected by measures of the variability of the policy 
implementation they faced, more so than the level.  By the reverse of the same token, initiatives 
that have minimal impact on de jure policy but which signal a decisive shift in policy 33 
 
implementation might have substantial and immediate impacts on investor expectations and 
initiate an acceleration of growth
11. 
Finally, our evidence speaks to the emerging debates about ―industrial policy‖ and its role 
in spurring ―structural transformation‖ (Lin 2009) or moves through the ―product space‖ 
(Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabasi, and Hausmann 2007) by acquiring ―capabilities‖ (Hausmann and 
Hidalgo 2009).  However, our data speak to this debate in two very different ways.   
On the one hand, there is a notion that ―industrial policy‖ is a danger because 
governments should only maintain a ―level playing field‖ that treats all firms, activities, and 
sectors exactly alike and just make and neutrally enforce a set of rules.  Whatever merits that 
might have where something like a level playing field could, in principle, be played on, our 
evidence strongly suggests that almost no firm is actually playing on a level playing field now—
both in that there appear to be massive deviations from compliance on average, and in the sense 
that those deviations vary widely across firms.  Whether or not there optimally ―should‖ be a 
level playing field there isn‘t one now, so industrial policy would be another form of ―unlevel‖ 
not an ―unleveling.‖      
Very much on the other hand, our evidence could be easily taken as evidence of just how 
hard it is for governments to pursue discretionary industrial policy.  With weak institutions the 
risks of available discretion being abused for ―rent seeking‖ and ―directly unproductive‖ 
activities along the lines of the classic critiques of Krueger (1974) are very real.  There is nothing 
inherently contradictory about the notion that industrial policy, if one could implement it well, 
would accelerate growth but that most countries, and especially those that need growth the most, 
lack the wherewithal for policy implementation.  This then raises as an important question 
whether or not one can square this circle and devise ―institutionally robust‖ industrial policies 
capable of implementation even when overall institutions are weak (Hausmann and Rodrik 2006, 
Rodrik 2008, 2009). 
                                                 
11 As many argue happened in China after 1978 after Deng‘s announcements or India with a shift to ―pro-business‖ 
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